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Abstract
This paper proposes a novel continuous-time dynamic contract framework that has a risk-limiting capability. If a
principal and an agent enter into such a contract, the principal can optimally manage its performance and risk with a
guarantee that the agent’s risk is less than or equal to a pre-specified level and that the agent’s expected payoff is greater
than or equal to another pre-specified threshold. We achieve such risk-management capabilities by formulating the
contract design problem as mean-variance constrained risk-sensitive control. A dynamic programming-based method
is developed to solve the problem. The key idea of our proposed solution method is to reformulate the inequality
constraints on the mean and the variance of the agent’s payoff as dynamical system constraints by introducing
new state and control variables. The reformulations use the martingale representation theorem. The proposed contract
method enables us to develop a new direct load control method that provides the load-serving entity with financial risk
management solutions in real-time electricity markets. We also propose an approximate decomposition of the optimal
contract design problem for multiple customers into multiple low-dimensional contract problems for one customer.
This allows the direct load control program to work with a large number of customers without any scalability issues.
Furthermore, the contract design procedure can be completely parallelized. The performance and usefulness of the
proposed contract method and its application to direct load control are demonstrated using data on the electric energy
consumption of customers in Austin, Texas as well as the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas’ locational marginal
price data.
I. INTRODUCTION
To reduce the greenhouse gases caused by electricity generation, there has been growing interest in and efforts
toward integrating renewable energy sources into the electric power grid. California, for example, plans to use
renewable resources to serve 33% of the electricity load by 2020 [1]. In particular, the penetration of solar and
wind energy resources is expected to significantly increase. However, the utilization of these resources is challenging
because they are uncertain and intermittent. To absorb the uncertainty in solar and wind power, for example, the
reserve capacity must be sufficiently large. In California, the increase in the reserve costs needs to be compensated
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2by all customers and the amount of the compensation per customer may not be negligible when California achieves
its goal of 33% renewable energy penetration [2].
Supply-side approaches have been proposed to address the uncertainty of renewable resources in economic
dispatch and unit commitment using stochastic dynamic programming [3], mixed-integer stochastic programming
[4] and robust optimization [5], among others. However, these aforementioned methods do not examine the potential
of demand-side resources in managing uncertain renewable generation or loads. To investigate this potential, this
paper proposes a demand-side solution that manages the uncertainty of customers’ solar and wind generation and
loads. The load-serving entity or the aggregator for the customers procures power or generation reserves in a day-
ahead market and the amount of procurement is determined based on a day-ahead load forecast. Because the actual
total load deviates from the procured power, the load-serving entity must purchase the deviated amount of power
in a real-time market to balance supply and demand. It is desirable for the load-serving entity to minimize the real-
time purchase of energy because the energy price and the reserve cost in the real-time market are normally higher
and more volatile than those in the day-ahead market. As the penetration of customers’ solar and wind generation
increases, however, the electricity price in the real-time market is highly volatile and the customers’ demand is
very difficult to predict. Therefore, the risk of spending a substantial budget in the real-time market increases. If
the load-serving entity bears this financial risk, the energy price in the customers’ tariff would inevitably increase.
To reduce this risk that the load-serving entity must face, we propose a contract approach for direct load control
in which the customer transfers the authority to control his or her load to the load-serving entity. Once the load-
serving entity and its customer enter into the contract, the load-serving entity can allocate a portion of the risk to
the customer through the compensation scheme and the control strategy for the customer’s load specified in the
contract. A customer might reasonably worry that such compensation and control could increase the risk for large
energy costs and a disruption of comfort. The proposed contract addresses this concern by guaranteeing that the
risk in the customer’s payoff, a weighted sum of energy costs and discomfort level, is limited by a pre-specified
threshold and that the mean of the customer’s payoff is greater than another pre-specified level. The former is called
the risk-limiting condition, and the latter is called the participation payoff condition. The compensation scheme and
the control strategy written in the contract must be designed such that their combination mitigates the load-serving
entity’s financial risk in the real-time market while satisfying the risk-limiting and participation payoff conditions
for the customer.
The key element of the proposed contract for such a demand-side management is direct load control that allows
the load-serving entity to actively use the customer’s load to manage its financial risk. A number of direct control
methods have been suggested for various types of electric loads such as thermostatically controlled loads [6], [7],
electric vehicles [8], [9] and deferrable loads [10], [11]. The objectives of existing direct load control methods
include shifting demand (e.g., ‘valley-filling’), providing ancillary services (e.g., frequency regulation) and energy
arbitrage [12], [13], [14]. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, however, the potential of direct load control for
financial risk management in real-time electricity markets has not yet been studied. We bridge the gap between
direct load control and risk management by proposing a contract-based approach.
3A variety of contract methods have been suggested for demand-side management in electric power systems. The
use of contracts for reducing energy price risk in spot markets has been investigated [15]. Interruptible service
contracts have been extensively studied, in which a customer takes risk of service interruption in return for a
discount in the energy price [16], [17], [18]. More recently, deadline-differentiated deferrable energy contracts
have been proposed to prevent the risk of a customer not receiving energy delivery by a pre-specified deadline
[19]. A different contract approach associated with durations-differentiated loads is studied in [20]. None of the
aforementioned contract methods, however, takes into account detailed electric load dynamics, which are essential
in direct load control to guarantee the customer’s comfort and the load’s system constraints.
To incorporate dynamics of electric loads in contracts, we adopt a dynamic contract framework, also called
a continuous-time principal-agent problem [21], [22]. In such a problem, a principal (e.g., a company) and an
agent (e.g., a worker) make a contract that specifies a compensation scheme and a control strategy in an uncertain
environment. The setting we consider in this work is called the first-best, in which the principal and the agent have
the same information and share the risk in the principal’s revenue stream. The principal can monitor the agent’s
control or effort and, therefore, can enforce the control strategy written in the contract. In the electricity setting,
regarding a load-serving entity as the principal and its customer as the agent, this first-best case is appropriate for
direct load control because the load-serving entity has the authority to monitor and control its customer’s electric
loads. A dynamic contract problem for the first-best case was first considered in [23]. It uses a simple principal-
agent model with exponential utility functions introduced by Holmstrom and Milgrom for moral hazard [21]. A
more general class of the first-best case dynamic contract problems is addressed in [24] by using the martingale
and convex duality methods [25], [26], [27], [28]. However, the proposed solution approach requires that the payoff
functions be differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave and that the dynamical system be a stochastic
integral equation. These restrictions are acceptable in many applications in economics and finance, but they may
exclude some important engineering problems, including direct load control, because they often require dynamical
systems and payoff functions be complicated. Furthermore, the aforementioned methods assume that the utility
function of the agent with respect to his or her payoff is given. However, in practice, it is difficult to have complete
knowledge of the agent’s utility function. In particular, if the agent’s utility function used in designing the contract
deviates from his or her actual utility, the agent may not want to enter into the contract again.
In this paper, we propose a novel dynamic contract method that overcomes the limitations of existing methods for
the first-best case. The proposed method uses the variance of the agent’s payoff as the risk measure for the agent.
By imposing a constraint on the variance, we can limit the risk the agent needs to bear. We call this constraint
the agent’s risk-limiting condition. In addition, the proposed method guarantees that the mean of the agent’s payoff
exceeds some pre-specified threshold. From the principal’s point of view, by executing an appropriately designed
compensation scheme and control strategy specified in the contract, the principal can transfer some portion of its
financial risk to the agent, respecting the agent’s risk-limiting condition. This variance approach does not require
complete knowledge of the agent’s utility function, which is difficult to obtain in practice. Such a risk-limiting
capability distinguishes our method from existing contract methods. To take into account the principal’s risk aversion,
4we formulate the contract design problem as risk-sensitive control [29], [30]. Due to the constraints on the mean
and the variance of the agent’s payoff, however, dynamic programming is not directly applicable. One may be able
to handle the constraints using the stochastic maximum principle or the duality method [31], [28]. However, these
approaches do not, in general, allow a globally optimal solution.
The theoretic contribution of the paper is to develop a method that gives a globally optimal solution of such mean-
variance constrained stochastic optimal control problems. More specifically, using the martingale representation
theorem, we reformulate the constraints on the mean and the variance of the agent’s payoff function, which are
difficult to handle, as two new dynamical systems controlled by new control variables. The first new system state
represents the agent’s future expected payoff with a modified diffusion term. The second new system state can
be interpreted as the remaining amount of risk the agent can bear. The former and latter systems are used to
reformulate the constraint on the mean and the variance of the agent’s payoff, respectively. It turns out that the
reformulated problem is risk-sensitive control with a stochastic target constraint in the augmented state space of
the original system and the new dynamical systems. A globally optimal solution to the reformulated problem can
be obtained by using the dynamic programming principle in the augmented state space. The value function of the
problem is computed by numerically solving an associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and is then used to
synthesize optimal compensation and control strategy. The proposed solution method allows more general system
models for loads and payoff functions for the principal and the agent than existing dynamic contract methods
for the first-best case. This flexibility and the risk-limiting capability of the proposed contract method make it
appropriate for direct load control policy which explicitly treats financial risk in real-time electricity markets. We
also propose an approximate decomposition method for the contract design problem: the problem for n agents
can be decomposed into n optimal contract design problems each for a single agent. This decomposition allows an
approximate contract with a provable suboptimality bound. Due to the decomposition, the computational complexity
of the proposed method increases linearly with the number of agents. Furthermore, the decomposed contract design
problem for an agent is independent of that for another agent. Therefore, the contract design procedures for multiple
customers can be completely parallelized.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The problem setting for direct load control and the definition of
the risk-limiting dynamic contract are presented in Section II. We reformulate the constraint on the variance of the
agent’s payoff, which is called the risk-limiting condition, as a constraint on the compensation provided to the agent
by introducing a new control variable in Section III. Using the reformulated constraint, we propose the method
for designing a globally optimal risk-limiting dynamic contract and discuss its decentralized implementation in
Section IV. Finally, the performance of the proposed contract method and its application to direct load control are
demonstrated with data on the electric energy consumption of Austin customers as well as the Electricity Reliability
Council of Texas’ (ERCOT’s) locational marginal price (LMP) data in Section V.
5II. THE SETTING
We consider a situation in which the load-serving entity wants to make a contract with n heterogeneous customers
to directly control each customer’s personal electric load, such as an air conditioner or a water heater. For simplicity,
we assume that each customer allows the load-serving entity control over only one of his or her loads, although the
proposed method is also applicable to the case of multiple loads per customer. The load-serving entity’s goal is to
manage the risk of spending a substantial budget in a real-time energy market by controlling the customers’ loads
in the direct load control program. We consider a finite time horizon contract: let [0, T ] be the period in which the
contract is effective.
A. Total Power Consumption
Let ηit ∈ R be the energy consumption (in kWh) up to time t ∈ [0, T ] by customer i and uit ∈ R be the power
consumption (in kW) by customer i’s electric load in the direct load control program. Note that even when uit = 0,
the total power consumption by customer i is not, in general, zero at time t due to the existence of the customer’s
other loads and possibly solar or wind generation (which can be considered as negative loads). If all the customers
enter into the contract, the load-serving entity has the authority to determine ui := {uit}0≤t≤T for i = 1, · · · , n.
The number, n, of customers is typically in the order of 103–105. Let u := (u1, · · · , un). The uncertainty in the
customers’ loads and solar and wind power generation causes the energy consumption process {ηt}0≤t≤T to be
stochastic. To describe the energy consumption process, we use a stochastic differential equation (SDE) model of
the form
dηit =
(
li(t) + u
i
t
)
dt+ σ˜i(t)dW
i
t , (1)
where li(t) ∈ R, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is the forecast of customer i’s loads (in kW) other than those in the direct load control
program. The effect of the load forecast error is modeled by the diffusion term, σ˜i(t)dW it , where W
i := {W it }0≤t≤T
is a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and the diffusion coefficient
σ˜i : [0, T ]→ R is a bounded function. We assume that W i and W j are independent for any i, j ∈ {1, · · · , n} such
that i 6= j. The functions li and σ˜i can be estimated from data on the electric energy consumption of customers in
Austin as explained in Section V. Furthermore, the validity of the standard Brownian motion in the model for the
proposed contract framework is tested using the data in Section V.
B. Energy Price and load-serving Entity’s Revenue in Real-Time Markets
Let p(t) ∈ R, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , be the amount of power procured by the load-serving entity in the day-ahead market.
We assume that p(t) is given. The energy price in the real-time market is chosen as the locational marginal price
(LMP). Let λt be the LMP at time t. The dynamics of the LMP can be modeled as the following SDE [32], [18]:
dλt = r0(ν(t)− lnλt)λtdt+ σ0(t)λtdW 0t , (2)
where W 0 := {W 0t }0≤t≤T is a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion on (Ω,F ,P) and the price volatility
σ0 : [0, T ]→ R is a bounded function. For simplicity, we assume that W 0 is independent of W i for i = 1, · · · , n,
6but our contract method can easily be extended to the case in which they are dependent. This model is suitable to
capture the mean-reverting behavior of energy prices in the real-time (spot) market: when the energy price is high
(resp. low), the supply tends to increase (resp. decrease) and, therefore, causes the price to decrease (resp. increase)
[33]. Let wt := lnλt, then w := {wt}0≤t≤T satisfies
dwt = r0(ν(t)− wt)dt+ σ0(t)dW 0t . (3)
We estimate r0, ν(t) and σ0(t) using the ERCOT LMP data in Section V. In principle, the LMP is not completely
exogenous because it is influenced by the power consumption of the customers’ loads. In this work, however, we
assume that this effect is negligible and, therefore, that the LMP is exogenous.
The load-serving entity’s revenue in the real-time market up to time t, denoted as zt ∈ R, is given by
zt =
∫ t
0
λs
(
p(s)ds−
n∑
i=1
dηis
)
.
Note that we assume that excess power is sold as easily as deficits are procured. This stochastic integral can be
rewritten as the following SDE:
dzt = λt
(
p(t)−
n∑
i=1
(li(t) + u
i
t)
)
dt−
n∑
i=1
λtσ˜i(t)dW
i
t . (4)
The load-serving entity’s revenue is affected by the control u of the customers’ loads in the direct load control pro-
gram. The set of feasible controls is chosen as Ui := {ui : [0, T ]→ U i|ui progressively measurable with respect to F (i)t },
where U i is a compact set in R and {F (i)t }0≤t≤T is the filtration generated by the two dimensional Brownian motion
W (i) := (W 0,W i). We also let U := U1 × · · · × Un.
C. Customers’ Loads
Consider customer i’s load in the direct load control program, and let xit ∈ R be the system state at time t ∈ [0, T ].
If the load is an air conditioner unit, then xit would represent the indoor temperature; if the load is a water heater,
it would represent the water temperature. Then, the system dynamics can be modeled as the following stochastic
differential equation:
dxit = fi(x
i
t, u
i
t)dt (5)
with the initial condition xi0 = x
0i for i = 1, · · · , n, where the control uit is a stochastic process. Although our
contract method can handle stochastic system models with a diffusion term, we use the model (5) for simplicity.
Here, we assume that fi : R× U i → R is continuous and that fi(x,u) is differentiable in x for any u ∈ U i. We
further assume that there exists a constant K such that for all (x,u) ∈ R× Ui∣∣∣∣∂fi(x,u)∂x
∣∣∣∣ ≤ K,
|f(x,u)| ≤ K(1 + |x|+ |u|).
7Then, there exists a unique solution xi := {xit}0≤t≤T ∈ L2(0, T ) for i = 1, · · ·n, where L2(0, T ) denotes the
space of all real-valued, progressively measurable stochastic processes x such that E
[∫ T
0
x2tdt
]
<∞. See [34] for
the proof.
Example 1. Let xit denote the indoor temperature of customer i at time t, and let Θi(t) represent the corresponding
outdoor temperature. Then, the dynamics of the indoor temperature can be described as the following equivalent
thermal parameter (ETP) model [35]:
dxit = [αi(Θi(t)− xit)− κiuit]dt (6)
for i = 1, · · · , n. Here, αi = R1,i/R2,i, where R1,i denotes the thermal conductance between the outdoor air and
indoor air and R2,i is the thermal conductance between the indoor air and the thermal mass for customer i’s room.
The positive constant κi converts an increase in energy (kWh) to a reduction in temperature (◦C) for customer i’s
air conditioner.
D. Payoff Functions
1) load-serving entity’s payoff: The load-serving entity’s payoff function is chosen as its profit in the direct load
control program. Let Ci ∈ R be the end-time compensation paid to customer i in the direct load control program
and µi(t) be the energy price per unit kWh at time t specified in customer i’s electricity tariff. We assume that
µi : [0, T ] → R is bounded. The load-serving entity’s total payoff in real time, i.e., neglecting the cost of power
procured in the day-ahead market, which is its revenue obtained from the customers, is then given by∫ T
0
dzt +
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
µi(t)dη
i
t −
n∑
i=1
Ci
=
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
[
(µi(t)− λt)
(
li(t) + u
i
t
)
+ λtpi(t)
]
dt+
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
(µi(t)− λt)σ˜i(t)dW it −
n∑
i=1
Ci,
where {p1(t), · · · , pn(t)} is a set satisfying
∑n
i=1 pi(t) = p(t) and the set of feasible compensation values is
chosen as Ci := {Ci ∈ R |Ci is F (i)T -measurable}. Let C := C1 × · · · ×Cn. We define the payoff function of the
load-serving entity as
JP [C, u] :=
n∑
i=1
(∫ T
0
rPi (t, wt, x
i
t, u
i
t)dt+
∫ T
0
σPi (t, wt)dW
i
t − Ci
)
, (7)
where rPi : [0, T ]× R× R× R→ R and σPi : [0, T ]× R→ R are such that
rPi (t, wt, x
i
t, u
i
t) := (µi(t)− ewt)(uit + li(t)) + ewtpi(t),
σPi (t, wt) := (µi(t)− ewt)σ˜i(t)
(8)
for i = 1, · · · , n. The superscript ‘P ’ represents the fact that the load-serving entity plays the role of the principal
in the contract. Note that in the direct load control application rPi is independent of x
i
t. We use the models (8) for
direct load control but the proposed contract design method is applicable to more general models of running payoff
and volatility. For notational simplicity, we will suppress the dependency of the functions on time.
82) Customer’s payoff: Each customer’s total payoff depends on (i) his or her economic profit and (ii) his or
her comfort level. Customer i’s profit can be computed as the compensation received minus the energy costs, i.e.,
Ci −
∫ T
0
µi(t)dη
i
t
= −
∫ T
0
µi(t)(li(t) + u
i
t)dt−
∫ T
0
µi(t)σ˜i(t)dW
i
t + C
i.
Customer i’s payoff function can be represented as
JAi [C
i, ui] :=
∫ T
0
rAi (x
i
t, u
i
t)dt+
∫ T
0
σAi (t)dW
i
t + C
i, (9)
where rAi : [0, T ]× R× R→ R and σAi : [0, T ]→ R are such that
rAi (t, x
i
t, u
i
t) := −µi(t)(li(t) + uit) + ri(xit, uit),
σAi (t) := −µi(t)σ˜i(t)
(10)
for i = 1, · · · , n. Here, ri(xit, uit) represents customer i’s comfort level given the system state xit and control uit.
The superscript ‘A’ represents the fact that the customer is the agent in the contract. We assume that there exist
constants B0 and B1 such that |rAi (x,u)| ≤ B0 +B1|x| for all x ∈ R given any u ∈ U i.
Example 2. Customer i’s discomfort level is zero if the indoor temperature, xit, is within a desirable temperature
range, [Θ,Θ]. The discomfort level increases as the indoor temperature increases above Θ or drops below Θ. If we
set the comfort level as the negative value of the discomfort level, then we can model customer i’s comfort level as
ri(x
i
t, u
i
t) = −ωi
[
(xit −Θ)+ + (Θ− xit)+
]
, (11)
where the constant parameter ωi represents the customer i’s valuation of comfort and (a)+ := a if a > 0 and
(a)+ := 0 otherwise for any a ∈ R.
E. Risk-Limiting Dynamic Contracts
The load-serving entity (principal) offers customer i a contract that specifies the compensation scheme, Ci, and
its control strategy, ui := {uit}0≤t≤T for i = 1, · · · , n. The contract is dynamic in the sense that the load-serving
entity uses the state feedback control strategy written in the contract to dynamically choose the control action each
customer must follow. Customer i (agent i) accepts the contract only if
1) (participation-payoff condition) the mean of customer i’s payoff is greater than or equal to some threshold,
bi ∈ R, i.e.,
E[JAi [Ci, ui]] ≥ bi, (12)
and
2) (risk-limiting condition) the variance of customer i’s payoff is less than or equal to some threshold, Si ∈ R,
i.e.,
Var[JAi [C
i, ui]] ≤ Si. (13)
9Note that variance is used as the risk measure of the customer’s payoff. We call bi and Si the participation payoff
and the risk share of customer i, respectively.
Let Λ := {(b1,S1), · · · , (bM ,SM )} be a set of given pairs of participation payoffs and risk shares. These pairs
are designed by the load-serving entity and provided to the customers. Customer i selects a pair (bi, Si) ∈ Λ and
the contract determined from this pair. Once each customer enters into a contract, the load-serving entity directly
controls each customer’s load following the control strategy specified in the contract. At the end of the contract
period, the load-serving entity compensates each customer according to the compensation scheme specified in the
contract.
More specifically, once customer i agrees to enter into the contract, the load-serving entity company has the
authority to control customer i’s load for maximizing the load-serving entity’s expected payoff under the constraints
1) and 2). Taking into account the risk of the load-serving entity’s payoff being small as well, we formulate the
problem of designing such a dynamic contract (C, u) as the following constrained risk-sensitive control problem:
max
C∈C,u∈U
− 1
θ
logE
[
exp(−θJP [C, u])] (14a)
subject to dwt = r0(ν(t)− wt)dt+ σ0(t)dW 0t (14b)
dxit = fi(x
i
t, u
i
t)dt (14c)
E[JAi [Ci, ui]] ≥ bi (14d)
Var[JAi [C
i, ui]] ≤ Si, (14e)
where θ ∈ R \ {0} is a constant, called the coefficient of load-serving entity’s risk-aversion. When θ is positive,
the risk-sensitive objective function penalizes the risk of the load-serving entity’s payoff being small because
− exp(−θJP ) is concave increasing in JP . Therefore, the load-serving entity can make a risk-averse decision by
solving (14). If θ < 0, the load-serving entity is risk-seeking. For intuition, note that the risk-sensitive objective
function is well approximated by a weighted sum of the mean and the variance of the payoff when |θ| is small
because the Taylor expansion of the risk-sensitive objective function is given by
− 1
θ
logE
[
exp(−θJP )] = E[JP ]− θ
2
Var[JP ] +O(θ2) (15)
as θ → 0. Note that the variance of the payoff is penalized when θ > 0.
The solution, (COPT, uOPT), to this problem is said to be the optimal risk-limiting dynamic contract for direct load
control. This problem of risk-limiting dynamic contract design is a mean-variance constrained-stochastic optimal
control problem that is not directly solvable via dynamic programming. In the following sections, we carefully
characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for the constraints on the mean and the variance of the customers’
payoff functions. The characterizations allow us to show that the contract design problem can be reformulated as
a risk-sensitive control problem with a stochastic target constraint that can be solved by dynamic programming.
The information availabilities to the load-serving entity and the customers in the direct load control program are
symmetric, as opposed to the case of indirect load control, in which the load-serving entity has limited observation
10
capability (e.g., [36]). More specifically, in the proposed framework, the load-serving entity can monitor the control
and state of the customers’ loads in the direct load control program as well as the energy price in the real-time
market. Furthermore, the load-serving entity has all the parameters and functions needed to design an optimal
contract. That is, it has the information of p, li, σ˜i, µi, r0, σ0, ν, which can be estimated from data as shown
in Section V, and the customers’ comfort functions ri and load models for i = 1, · · · , n. In practice, the comfort
functions and load models can be identified using a training period. Each customer, in principle, can have the same
information. However, customer i needs to know only p, li, σ˜i, µi, r0, σ0, ν, his or her own comfort function
and load model. The proposed framework assumes that each customer can monitor the control and state of his
or her load in the direct load control program and the energy price in the real-time market. Another important
feature of the proposed contract method is that the interactions between the load-serving entity and its customers
can be decoupled from each other because one customer’s load does not affect those of other customers and the
participation payoff and risk-limiting conditions are personalized. This feature will allow us to decentralize the
control of loads as shown in Section IV-B.
We assume that the contract period [0, T ] is a time interval within 24 hours, but the proposed method can handle
arbitrary finite time horizons. Therefore, the customers and the load-serving entity, in principle, can renew the
contracts every day. However, it may not be convenient for each customer to choose a contract or, equivalently, a
participation payoff and a risk share pair every day. This issue can be resolved by automatically choosing the contract
for the current day as that for the previous day unless the customer explicitly wants to change it. Daily contracts
have a practical advantage: the day-ahead forecasts of the LMP model parameters and demand uncertainty (and
outdoor temperature in the case of air conditioners) can be incorporated into the contracts. Therefore, the contracts
can be designed using accurate models. We also assume that each customer does not strategically control other
loads to modify the forecasted σ˜i by the load-serving entity. This assumption can be justified in two ways. First,
the load-serving entity can make a contract to control multiple loads of a customer so that the customer has little
flexibility to change σ˜i. Second, even if the customer strategically affects σ˜i in one day, the customer’s gain in the
next day is marginal because the contract is renewed with a new estimate σ˜i that incorporates any strategic behavior.
Formally, this problem can be formulated as a Stackelberg differential game, in which the the load-serving entity
chooses the estimates of li and σ˜i for the contract period [0, T ] assuming that the customer has no incentive to
deviate from σ˜i in the contract period. A similar problem is considered in our previous work [36]. This Stackelberg
differential game problem is out of the scope of this paper and will be addressed in our future work on risk-limiting
dynamic contracts for indirect load control.
III. RISK-LIMITING COMPENSATION
The risk-limiting condition (13) is an inequality constraint on the variance of each agent’s payoff. This constraint
hinders us from using the dynamic programming principle to solve the contract design problem (14). In this section,
we characterize a condition on the end-time compensation, which is equivalent to the risk-limiting condition. It
turns out that the new equivalent condition allows us to formulate the contract design problem as a risk-sensitive
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control problem that can be solved by dynamic programming.
We begin by defining the following set of stochastic processes: let Γi be the set of processes ξi := {ξit}0≤t≤T ,
ξit = (ξ
i,1
t , ξ
i,2
t ) ∈ R1×2 such that
(i) ξit is F (i)t -progressively measurable;
(ii) E
[∫ T
0
‖ξit‖2dt
]
<∞
for i = 1, · · · , n. We also let Γ := Γ1× · · ·×Γn. In the next lemma, we show that there exists a unique process in
this set such that its integral over the Brownian motion W (i) := (W 0,W i) corresponds to the difference between
the agent’s payoff and its mean value.
Lemma 1. Fix i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. Given Ci ∈ Ci and ui ∈ Ui, there exists a unique (up to a set of measure zero)
stochastic process ξi = {ξit}0≤t≤T ∈ Γi such that
JAi [C
i, ui]− E[JAi [Ci, ui]] =
∫ T
0
ξitdW
(i)
t . (16)
Proof: Fix Ci ∈ Ci and ui ∈ Ui. We introduce a new process
qit := E
[∫ T
t
rAi (x
i
s, u
i
s)ds+ C
i
∣∣∣∣∣ F (i)t
]
.
Here, the expectation is conditioned over the filtration {F (i)t }0≤t≤T generated by the Brownian motion W (i) =
(W 0,W i). We notice that the process
qit +
∫ t
0
rAi (x
i
s, u
i
s)ds = E
[∫ T
0
rAi (x
i
s, u
i
s)ds+ C
i
∣∣∣∣∣ F (i)t
]
is martingale. Recall that there exist constants B0 and B1 such that∣∣rAi (x,u)∣∣ ≤ B0 +B1|x|
for all x ∈ R and u ∈ U i. Therefore, we have(∫ t
0
rAi (x
i
s, u
i
s)ds
)2
≤
∫ t
0
(B0 +B1|xis|)2ds,
which implies that for t ∈ [0, T ]
E
[(∫ t
0
rAi (x
i
s, u
i
s)ds
)2]
<∞ (17)
because xi ∈ L2(0, T ). From the definition of qit, we deduce that
E
[
(qit)
2
]
<∞. (18)
Due to the inequalities (17) and (18), we obtain
E
[(
qit +
∫ t
0
rAi (x
i
s, u
i
s)ds
)2]
<∞.
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The Martingale representation theorem (e.g., [37], [38]) suggests that there exists a unique (up to set of measure
zero) process ξ¯i = {ξ¯it}0≤t≤T ∈ Γi such that
qiT +
∫ T
0
rAi (x
i
t, u
i
t)dt = q
i
0 +
∫ T
0
ξ¯itdW
(i)
t .
We also note that
qiT = C
i,
qi0 = E[JAi [Ci, ui]].
Therefore, we obtain
JAi [C
i, ui] = E[JAi [Ci, ui]] +
∫ T
0
σAi (t)dW
i
t +
∫ T
0
ξ¯itdW
(i)
t .
Set ξ1,it := ξ¯
1,i
t and ξ
2,i
t := ξ¯
2,i
t + σ
A
i (t), then ξ
i is in Γi and satisfies (16).
This lemma represents the agent’s payoff as the sum of its mean value and the Itoˆ integral of the new process
ξi along the Brownian motion W (i). The following theorem suggests that this representation allows reformulation
of the risk-limiting condition (13).
Theorem 1. Fix i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and ui ∈ Ui. The risk-limiting condition holds, i.e.,
Var[JAi [C
i, ui]] ≤ Si (19)
if and only if there exists a unique (up to set of measure zero) γi ∈ Γi such that
Ci = E[JAi [Ci, ui]]−
∫ T
0
rAi (x
i
t, u
i
t)dt−
∫ T
0
σAi (t)dW
i
t +
∫ T
0
γitdW
(i)
t (20)
and
E
[∫ T
0
‖γit‖2dt
]
≤ Si. (21)
Proof: Suppose that there exists γi ∈ Γi such that (20) and (21) hold. Then,
JAi [C
i, ui]− E[JAi [Ci, ui]] =
∫ T
0
γitdW
(i)
t .
Due to the Itoˆ’s isometry, we have
Var[JAi [C
i, ui]] = E
[∫ T
0
‖γit‖2dt
]
.
Combining this equality and (21), we obtain the risk-limiting condition (19).
Suppose now that the risk-limiting condition (19) holds. Lemma 1 suggests that there exists ξi ∈ Γi such that
JAi [C
i, ui]− E[JAi [Ci, ui]] =
∫ T
0
ξitdW
(i)
t .
The variance of agent i’s payoff is given by
Var[JAi [C
i, ui]] = E
[∫ T
0
‖ξit‖2dt
]
.
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Due to the risk-limiting condition (19), we have
E
[∫ T
0
‖ξit‖2dt
]
≤ Si.
Therefore, ξi ∈ Γi satisfies both (20) and (21). Such a process must be unique up to a set of measure zero due to
Lemma 1.
The next corollary suggests a way to construct the end-time compensation given u ∈ U and γ ∈ Γ.
Corollary 1. Fix u ∈ U and γ ∈ Γ such that
E
[∫ T
0
‖γit‖2dt
]
≤ Si (22)
for i = 1, · · · , n. The risk-limiting condition (13) holds if and only if the end-time compensation, C ∈ C, satisfies
Ci = E[JAi [Ci, ui]]−
∫ T
0
rAi (x
i
t, u
i
t)dt−
∫ T
0
σAi (t)dW
i
t +
∫ T
0
γitdW
(i)
t
for i = 1, · · · , n.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 imply that, given ui ∈ Ui, determining Ci ∈ Ci is equivalent to choosing γi ∈ Γi
such that it satisfies (22). In the next section, we consider γi ∈ Γi as a two-dimensional decision variable and
then construct the end-time compensation using an optimal γi. We also show that the mean of agent i’s payoff is
given by the participation payoff bi if an optimal contract is chosen. However, even if we reformulate the contract
design problem (14) as a stochastic optimal control in which the decision variables are ui and γi, i = 1, · · · , n,
the integral constraint (22) prohibits us from using dynamic programming to solve the reformulated problem. We
resolve this issue in the following section by introducing new state and control variables.
IV. RISK-LIMITING DYNAMIC CONTRACT DESIGN
We now propose the solution method for risk-limiting dynamic contract design problem (14) given (bi, Si) ∈ Λ
for i = 1, · · · , n. Recall that the principal’s objective is to maximize its risk-sensitive payoff with a guarantee that
the participation payoff and risk-limiting conditions for all the agents are satisfied. The risk of each agent’s payoff
being too small is limited by the variance constraint (14e), which is the risk-limiting condition. On the other hand,
small values of the principal’s payoff are penalized by maximizing the risk-sensitive objective function (14a) when
the risk-aversion coefficient θ is positive. In other words, if the principal is risk-averse, she transfers her financial
risk to the agents as long as the agents’ risk-limiting conditions are respected.
The contract design problem (14) is a constrained stochastic optimal control problem that cannot be directly
solved by dynamic programming [39]. The stochastic maximum principle approach may be used to handle the
constraints [31], [40]. However, it is not capable of finding a globally optimal solution unless the problem is
concave in both C and u. To obtain a globally optimal solution, we reformulate the problem as a risk-sensitive
control problem that can be solved by dynamic programming. The key idea is to introduce two new state variables.
The first state variable’s value at the terminal time allows us to construct the end-time compensation using Theorem
14
1. The second variable is used to reformulate the constraint (21) on the new decision variable, γ, as an SDE.
However, the dynamic programming approach, in general, has an inherent scalability issue: the computational
complexity exponentially increases as the system dimension increases (e.g., [41]). We overcome this scalability
issue by proposing an approximate decomposition of the contract design problem for all agents into n lower-
dimensional contract design problems, each for a single agent, where n is the number of agents.
A. Reformulation
We show that the solution of the contract design problem (14) can be obtained by solving the following risk-
sensitive control problem:
max
u∈U,γ∈Γ,ζ∈Γ
− 1
θ
logE
[
exp
(−θJ¯P [u, γ, ζ])] (23a)
subject to dwt = r0(ν(t)− wt)dt+ σ0(t)dW 0t (23b)
dxit = fi(x
i
t, u
i
t)dt (23c)
dvit = −rAi (xit, uit)dt+ γi,1t dW 0t + (γi,2t − σAi (t))dW it (23d)
vi0 = bi (23e)
dyit = −‖γit‖2dt+ ζitdW (i)t (23f)
yi0 = Si (23g)
yiT ≥ 0 a.s., (23h)
where J¯P is the reformulated principal’s payoff given by
J¯P [u, γ, ζ] :=
n∑
i=1
(∫ T
0
rPi (wt, x
i
t, u
i
t) +
∫ T
0
σPi (wt)dWt − viT
)
.
Note that we now view γ ∈ Γ as a decision variable instead of C ∈ C. This is feasible due to Theorem 1 and
Corollary 1. The new state yi and new decision variable ζi handle the integral constraint (21) in Theorem 1.
Intuitively speaking, the first new state variable vit represents agent i’s expected future payoff with a modified
diffusion term. The second new state yit can be interpreted as the remaining amount of risk that agent i can bear
from time t. Having these interpretations, we can show that the terminal value of the first new state variable can
be used to construct an optimal end-time compensation and that of the second new state variable must be greater
than or equal to zero to satisfy agent i’s risk-limiting condition. These two claims are shown in Theorem 2.
Another important observation is that the problem is now defined in the augmented state space of wt, xt :=
(x1t , · · · , xnt ) ∈ Rn, vt := (v1t , · · · , vnt ) ∈ Rn and yt := (y1t , · · · , ynt ) ∈ Rn. Therefore, the total system dimension
is 3n+ 1. This reformulated problem can be decentralized into n three dimensional risk-sensitive control problems,
as shown in Section IV-B.
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Theorem 2. Let (uOPT, γOPT, ζOPT) be the solution to (23). We also let xOPT, vOPT and yOPT denote the processes driven
by (23c), (23d) and (23f) with (uOPT, γOPT, ζOPT), respectively. Define
COPT,i := vOPT,iT (24)
for i = 1, · · · , n. Then, (COPT, uOPT) is an optimal risk-limiting dynamic contract, i.e., it solves (14).
Proof: We first observe that
JAi [C
OPT,i, uOPT,i] =
∫ T
0
rAi (x
OPT,i
t , u
OPT,i
t )dt+
∫ T
0
σAi (t)dW
i
t + v
∗i
T
= bi +
∫ T
0
γOPT,it dW
(i)
t
(25)
due to the SDE (23d) with the initial condition (23e). Therefore, we have
E[JAi [COPT,i, uOPT,i]] = bi, (26)
which implies that the participation payoff condition (14d) holds. Furthermore, the variance of agent i’s payoff with
(COPT,i, uOPT,i) is given by
Var[JAi [C
OPT,i, uOPT,i]] = E
[∫ T
0
‖γOPT,it ‖2dt
]
due to the Itoˆ’s isometry. We also notice that
yOPT,iT = Si −
∫ T
0
‖γOPT,it ‖2dt+
∫ T
0
ζOPT,it dW
(i)
t ,
which suggests that
Var[JAi [C
OPT,i, uOPT,i]] = E
[
Si − yOPT,iT +
∫ T
0
ζOPT,it dW
(i)
t
]
.
Hence, if yOPT,iT ≥ 0 a.s., the risk-limiting condition (14e) also holds. Therefore, (COPT, uOPT) is a feasible dynamic
contract.
Suppose that (COPT, uOPT) is not a solution of (14) and select a solution, (Cˆ, uˆ), of (14). Theorem 1 suggests that
there exists a unique (up to set of measure zero) γˆ ∈ Γ such that
Cˆi = E[JAi [Cˆi, uˆi]]−
∫ T
0
rAi (xˆ
i
t, uˆ
i
t)dt−
∫ T
0
σAi (t)dW
i
t +
∫ T
0
γˆitdW
(i)
t
and
E
[∫ T
0
‖γˆit‖2dt
]
≤ Si. (27)
We claim that (uˆ, γˆ) satisfies all the constraints of (23) with the stochastic process vˆ := {vˆt}0≤t≤T defined as
vˆit := vˆ
i
0 −
∫ t
0
rAi (xˆ
i
s, uˆ
i
s)ds+
∫ t
0
(γˆis − σAi (s))dW is
for some initial value vˆi0 ∈ R such that
vˆiT = Cˆ
i. (28)
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It is clear that the process vˆi satisfies the SDE (23d) for i = 1, · · · , n by definition. Additionally, note that
E[JAi [Cˆi, uˆi]] = vˆi0.
Suppose that vˆ does not satisfy the initial condition (23e). We first assume that there exists j ∈ {1, · · · , n} such
that vˆj0 > bj . Define a new end-time compensation C
′ as
C ′i :=
 Cˆj − (vˆ
j
0 − bj) if i = j
Cˆi otherwise.
We then have
E[JAj [C ′j , uˆj ]]− C ′j = E[JAj [Cˆj , uˆj ]]− Cˆj
= vˆj0 − Cˆj ,
which implies that
E[JAj [C ′j , uˆj ]] = bj .
Therefore, (C ′, uˆ) satisfies the participation payoff condition (14d) for all i = 1, · · · , n. The risk-limiting condition
also holds with (C ′, uˆ) because the difference between C ′ and Cˆ is deterministic. On the other hand, we notice
that
JP [C ′, uˆ] > JP [Cˆ, uˆ]
because C ′j < Cˆj and C ′i = Cˆi for i 6= j. The contract (C ′, uˆ) satisfies all the constraints of (14) and is strictly
better than (Cˆ, uˆ). This is a contradiction because (Cˆ, uˆ) solves the contract design problem (14). Therefore, vˆi0
must be equal to the participation payoff bi for i = 1, · · · , n. Hence, (uˆ, γˆ) satisfies all the constraints of (23) with
the processes yˆ and xˆ, where xˆ solves (23c) with the control uˆ.
We define a stochastic process y˜i := {y˜it}0≤t≤T as
y˜it := E
[∫ T
t
‖γˆit‖2dt
∣∣∣∣∣ F (i)t
]
.
Note that
y˜it +
∫ t
0
‖γˆis‖2ds = E
[∫ T
0
‖γˆit‖2dt
∣∣∣∣∣ F (i)t
]
is martingale. Furthermore, E
[(
y˜it +
∫ t
0
‖γˆis‖2ds
)2]
<∞ because γˆi ∈ Γi. Therefore, the martingale representation
theorem suggests that there exists a unique (up to a set of measure zero) ζˆi ∈ Γi such that
y˜it +
∫ t
0
‖γˆit‖2dt = y˜i0 +
∫ t
0
ζˆitdW
(i)
t .
Therefore, the process y˜i solves (23f) with (γˆ, ζˆ). Due to (27), we also have
y˜i0 ≤ Si
and hence the constraint (23g) is satisfied. We define another stochastic process yˆi := {yˆit}0≤t≤T as
yˆit := y˜
i
t + Si − y˜i0
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for t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, we have yˆi0 = Si and yˆiT ≥ 0 because y˜iT = 0 by definition. Hence, yˆi satisfies the
constraints (23g) and (23h).
Since (Cˆ, uˆ) solves (14), while (COPT, uOPT) does not, the following inequality holds:
E[− exp(−θJP [Cˆ, uˆ])] > E[− exp(−θJP [COPT, uOPT])].
This inequality can be rewritten as
E
[
− exp
(
−θ
n∑
i=1
(∫ T
0
rPi (wt, xˆ
i
t, uˆ
i
t)dt− vˆiT
))]
>
E
[
− exp
(
−θ
n∑
i=1
(∫ T
0
rPi (wt, x
OPT,i
t , u
OPT,i
t )dt− vOPT,iT
))]
due to (28) and (24). This is contradictory to the fact that (uOPT, γOPT, ζOPT) is a solution to (23). Therefore, (COPT, uOPT)
should solve (14) and hence an optimal risk-limiting dynamic contract.
We observe that the agents’ expected payoff must be equal to their participation payoffs from (26), i.e., the
inequalities (14d) for the participation payoff are always binding at an optimal contract. Intuitively speaking, if
the agent’s expected payoff is strictly greater than his or her participation payoff, the principal has an incentive to
decrease the end-time compensation for the agent. The equality (25) also suggests that each agent’s payoff can be
completely characterized by his or her participation payoff and the new control variable γ if an optimal contract is
executed.
Corollary 2. Agent i’s payoff with an optimal risk-limiting dynamic contract (COPT, uOPT) is given by
JAi [C
OPT,i, uOPT,i] = bi +
∫ T
0
γOPT,it dW
(i)
t
for i = 1, · · · , n. Therefore,
E
[
JAi [C
OPT,i, uOPT,i]
]
= bi.
B. Decoupled Contract Design and Decentralized Control
We propose an approximate decomposition of the contract design problem (14) into n low dimensional problems
using the fact that the system dynamics (14c), the participation payoff condition (14d) and the risk-limiting condition
(14e) for one agent are decoupled from those for other agents and that W 1, · · · ,Wn are mutually independent. The
approximate solution obtained using this decomposition has a guaranteed suboptimality bound. This decomposition
enables the direct load control program with the proposed dynamic contracts to handle a large population of agents
without scalability issues.
More specifically, for each i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, the approximate risk-limiting dynamic contract for agent i can be
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obtained by solving the following risk-sensitive control problem:
max
ui∈Ui,
γi∈Γi,ζi∈Γi
− 1
θ
logE
[
exp
(−θJ¯Pi [ui, γi, ζi])]
subject to dwt = r0(ν(t)− wt)dt+ σ0(t)dW 0t
dxit = fi(x
i
t, u
i
t)dt
dyit = −‖γit‖2dt+ ζitdW (i)t
yi0 = Si
yiT ≥ 0 a.s.,
(29)
where
J¯Pi [u
i, γi, ζi] := −bi +
∫ T
0
(rPi (wt, x
i
t, u
i
t) + r
A
i (x
i
t, u
i
t))dt+
∫ T
0
(σPi (wt) + σ
A
i (t))dW
i
t −
∫ T
0
γitdW
(i)
t .
Note that the system for vi is absorbed into the modified payoff function J¯Pi . It is clear that this decomposition
is exact when σ0 ≡ 0 due to the mutual independence of {W 1, · · · ,Wn}. In addition, the following proposition
suggests that the approximate contract obtained using the proposed decomposition has a provable suboptimality
bound, which can be computed a posteriori.
Proposition 1. Let (uOPT, γOPT, ζOPT) and (u∗i, γ∗i, ζ∗i) be the solutions to (14) and (29), respectively. We also let
u¯i be the solution to
max
ui∈Ui
E[J¯Pi [ui, 0, 0]]
subject to dwt = r0(ν(t)− wt)dt+ σ0(t)dW 0t
dxit = fi(x
i
t, u
i
t)dt.
(30)
Suppose that E[J¯P [u, 0, 0]] > 0, where u¯ := (u¯1, · · · , u¯n). Set
ρ :=
− 1θ logE
[
exp
(−θJ¯P [u∗, γ∗, ζ∗])]
E[J¯P [u¯, 0, 0]]
.
Then, the following suboptimality bound holds:
ρ
(
−1
θ
logE
[
exp
(−θJ¯P [uOPT, γOPT, ζOPT])]) ≤ −1
θ
logE
[
exp
(−θJ¯P [u∗, γ∗, ζ∗])] (31)
for θ > 0.
Proof: Using Jensen’s inequality, we have
−1
θ
logE
[
exp
(−θJ¯P [uOPT, γOPT, ζOPT])] ≤ −1
θ
log exp
(−θE[J¯P [uOPT, γOPT, ζOPT]])
= E[J¯P [uOPT, γOPT, ζOPT]].
When the principal is risk-neutral, the principal’s payoff is independent of (γ, ζ) and setting (γ, ζ) = (0, 0) always
satisfies the risk-limiting condition. From this observation, we claim that (u¯, 0, 0) solves the problem (14) when
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θ = 0, i.e., the objective function is replaced with E[J¯P [u, γ, ζ]]. We first note that (u¯, 0, 0) satisfies all the
constraints in (14). Suppose that (u¯, 0, 0) does not solve (14) and choose a solution, (uˆ, γˆ, ζˆ), of (14). Because
E[J¯Pi [uˆi, γˆ, ζˆ]] = E[J¯Pi [uˆi, 0, 0]] and uˆ satisfies the constraint of (30), the following inequality holds:
E[J¯Pi [uˆi, γˆi, ζˆi]] = E[J¯Pi [uˆi, 0, 0]] ≤ E[J¯Pi [u¯i, 0, 0]].
Therefore, we have
E[J¯P [uˆ, γˆ, ζˆ]] =
n∑
i=1
E[J¯Pi [uˆi, γˆi, ζˆi]]
≤
n∑
i=1
E[J¯Pi [u¯i, 0, 0]] = E[J¯P [u¯, 0, 0]].
This inequality is contradictory to the fact that (u¯, 0, 0) does not solve (14). Therefore,
E[J¯P [uOPT, γOPT, ζOPT]] ≤ E[J¯P [u¯, 0, 0]].
As a result, the suboptimality bound (31) holds.
Note that the suboptimality bound can be computed by solving (29) and (30) for each i while it is not feasible
to directly solve (14) for n > 1. This proposition implies that the proposed decomposition tends to be exact as the
coefficient θ of the principal’s risk aversion goes to zero because ρ → 1 as θ → 0. Furthermore, the approximate
contract (C∗, u∗) satisfies the participation-payoff condition (12) and the risk-limiting condition (13).
Due to this decomposition, the contract design for agent i only requires the state space, R3, of (wt, xit, yit) rather
than the full joint state space, R3n+1, of (wt, xt, vt, yt). Therefore, the computational complexity of designing a
risk-limiting contract for an agent is independent of the total number of agents. The decomposed problem for agent
i is solved via dynamic programming over the reduced state space, R3, of (wt, xit, yit) as follows. We set the feasible
set of control as
Ωi := {(ui, γi, ζi) ∈ Ui × Γi × Γi | yiT ≥ 0 a.s.}.
To synthesize a risk-limiting dynamic contract for agent i, we first define the value function of (29) associated with
agent i as
φi(w,xi,yi, t) := max
(ui,γi,ζi)∈Ωi
−1
θ
logEw,xi,yi,t[
exp
(
−θ
(∫ T
t
Ri(ws, x
i
s, u
i
s)ds+
∫ T
t
Gi(ws, γ
i
s)dW
(i)
s − bi
))]
,
(32)
where Ew,xi,yi,t[A] denotes the expectation of A conditioned on (wt, xit, yit) = (w,xi,yi), and
Ri(w,xi,u) := r
P
i (w,xi,u) + r
A
i (xi,u),
Gi(t,w,γ) :=
[
−γ1 −γ2 + σPi (w) + σAi (t))
]
.
To handle the constraint yiT ≥ 0 a.s., which is often called the stochastic target constraint, we use the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) characterization proposed in [42]. This characterization converts the target constraint into a
‘classical’ state constraint using the geometric dynamic programming principle [43]. The reformulated constraint is
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embedded in an auxiliary value function. This auxiliary value function is a viscosity solution of an HJB equation.
Applying the dynamic programming principle on the original value function (32), one can derive a constrained-HJB
equation in which the stochastic target constraint is reformulated as the constraints on the auxiliary value function
and the control. In our case, the auxiliary value function is a zero function. Let
Ui(yi) := {(u,γ, ζ) ∈ U i × R2 × R2 | γ = ζ = 0 if yi ≤ 0}.
Then, the stochastic target constraint is simply incorporated into the following constrained-HJB equation:
∂φi
∂t
+ max
(u,γ,ζ)
∈Ui(yi)
{
(Fi(w,xi,u,γ)− θΣ(ζ)Gi(w,γ)>)>Dφi
+Ri(w,xi,u)− θ
2
‖Gi(w,γ)‖2 − θ
2
‖Σ(ζ)>Dφi‖2 + 1
2
tr(Σ(ζ)Σ(ζ)>D2φi)
}
= 0,
φi(w,xi,yi, T ) = −bi,
whose viscosity solution corresponds to the value function (32) [44], [34], [42], where
Fi(t,w,xi,u,γ) :=

r0(ν(t)−w)
fi(xi,u)
−‖γ‖2
 , Σ(t, ζ) :=

σ0(t) 0
0 0
ζ1 ζ2
 .
In general, an analytic solution of the HJB equation is difficult to find. Therefore, we grid up the state space,
which corresponds to the domain of the PDE, and we numerically evaluate the solution at the grid points using
convergent schemes, e.g., [45], [46]. After solving the HJB equation, we can use the value function to compute
an optimal compensation scheme, C∗, and an optimal control strategy, u∗. Set (w0, x∗i0 , y
∗i
0 ) = (lnλ
0, x0i, Si) for
i = 1, · · · , n. Given the process x∗is := (w∗s , x∗is , y∗is ) ∈ R3 for s ∈ [0, t], we can determine an optimal control
strategy as
(u∗it , γ
∗i
t , ζ
∗i
t ) = arg max
(u,γ,ζ)∈Ui(yi)
{
(Fi(wt, x
∗i
t ,u,γ)− θΣ(ζ)Gi(wt,γ)>)>Dφi(x∗it , t)
+Ri(wt, x
∗i
t ,u)−
θ
2
‖Gi(wt,γ)‖2 − θ
2
‖Σ(ζ)>Dφi(x∗it , t)‖2
+
1
2
tr
(
Σ(ζ)Σ(ζ)>D2φi(x∗it , t)
)}
for i = 1, · · · , n and for t ∈ [0, T ]. Note that v∗it and y∗it can be computed by integrating the SDEs (23d) and (23f)
over time with the control (u∗is , γ
∗i
s , ζ
∗i
s ) for s ∈ [0, t), respectively. Then, an optimal compensation scheme can be
obtained as C∗ = v∗T which is proposed in Theorem 2. A more detailed discussion regarding how to synthesize
an optimal control using a viscosity solution of an associated HJB equation can be found in [47] even when the
viscosity solution is not differentiable.
The synthesized optimal control is written into the contract and the customer must follow the control strategy
if he or she enters into the contract. Note that the control for one load is independent of that for another load.
Furthermore, the optimal control for a load is given as state-feedback, where the state variables only require the
energy price in the real-time market and the local information of the load. Therefore, the proposed control can
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Fig. 1: Implementation of the proposed contracts: the controls of loads can be decentralized with a broadcast of
price (LMP) information, while a centralized monitoring is required. The compensations are provided at the end of
the contract period.
be decentralized with a broadcast of the price information, i.e., the local controller in which the optimal control
strategy is programmed is sufficient for the implementation of the contract as depicted in Fig. 1. On the other hand,
the load-serving entity still needs to monitor the state, the control and the forecast error for each customer to ensure
that each customer follows the optimal control strategy written in the contract. The total power consumption of
each customer monitored by a smart meter can be used to compute the forecast error. In addition, the sensors for
loads such as thermostats provide the state and control information. The monitored information could be transferred
to the load-serving entity through a one-way data connection such as the Internet. The information gathered by the
monitoring is also used to compute the optimal compensation provided to each customer at the end of the contract
period.
V. APPLICATION TO DIRECT LOAD CONTROL FOR FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT
In this section, we apply the proposed risk-limiting dynamic contracts to direct load control. The performance
and usefulness of the novel direct load control program for financial risk management are demonstrated using the
data of LMPs in the ERCOT and the electric energy consumption of customers in Austin, Texas.
A. Data and Setting
We consider a scenario in which each customer provides one air conditioner for the proposed direct load control
program. We use the ETP model (6) for the customer’s indoor temperature dynamics given in Example 1. The set
of feasible control values is chosen as U i := {0, 2}, assuming that customer i’s air conditioner consumes 0kW
in its OFF state and 2kW in its ON state. The model parameters are chosen as αi = 0.1 and κi = 1.5, which
are calculated based on the Residential module user’s guide from GridLAB-D and are physically reasonable [48].
Customer i’s comfort level is chosen as (11) in Example 2, with ωi = 0.15. We set the customer’s desirable indoor
temperature range, [Θ,Θ], as [20◦C, 22◦C]. We choose the contract period as [10h, 18h].
We use customers’ electric energy consumption data in Austin, Texas [49] to estimate the load profile li(t) and the
diffusion coefficient σ˜i(t) in (1). The load li(t) is chosen as the mean value of the customer i’s power consumption
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Fig. 2: (a) Locational marginal price (LMP) in Austin, Texas, from July 1, 2013 to July 10, 2013. (b) Ten sampled
trajectories of LMP, {λt}0≤t≤T , generated by our identified price model (2).
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Fig. 3: Outdoor air temperature, Θ(t), in Austin, Texas, on July 5, 2013.
at t other than the air conditioner. For the estimation of σ˜i, we apply the Kalman filter [50], [51] over the data set
for the summer period, from June to September 2013, assuming that customer i’s energy consumption profile other
than the air conditioner for one day in the period represents one sampled trajectory. We then scale the estimated
diffusion coefficient by a constant factor such that
∫ T
0
σ˜i(t)
2dt is equal to the variance of the energy consumption
data. This scaling guarantees that Var[JAi [0, 0]] is equal to the variance of the customer’s energy cost.
The price model (2) is identified using the ERCOT LMP data at the settlement point, AUSTIN PLANT, from
July 1, 2013 to July 10, 2013 [52]. We estimate the parameters, r0, ν(t) and σ0(t), by applying the Kalman filter
on the transformed linear model (3). The LMP data and samples of the price profile generated by the identified
model are shown in Fig. 2.
We use the NOAA Quality Controlled Local Climatological Data in Austin, Texas for the outdoor temperature
profile [53]. The outdoor temperature, Θ(t), at time t ∈ [10h, 18h] is chosen as the temperature on July 5, 2013, at
time t ∈ [10h, 18h] and is shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 4: The simulation results with the contract: (a) variance of the load-serving entity’s payoff. (b) variance of the
customer’s payoff and the risk share Si = ρS¯i.
B. Comparison to Optimal Load Control by Customers
Suppose that customer i does not participate in the direct load control program and has the following payoff:
JˆAi [u
i] :=
∫ T
0
rAi (x
i
t, u
i
t)dt+
∫ T
0
σAi (t)dW
i
t , (33)
where rAi and σ
A
i are given by (10). The solution of the following optimal control problem maximizes customer
i’s expected payoff:
max
ui∈Ui
E[JˆAi [ui]] :=
∫ T
0
rAi (x
i
t, u
i
t)dt
subject to dxit = fi(x
i
t, u
i
t)dt.
(34)
The optimal control can be obtained using the viscosity solution of the following HJB equation [47]:
∂φˆi(xi, t)
∂t
+ max
u∈Ui
{f(xi,u)Dxi φˆi(xi, t) + rAi (xi,u)} = 0,
φˆi(xi, T ) = 0.
Let uˆ∗i be an optimal control, i.e., a solution to (34). We let b¯i := E[JˆAi [uˆ∗i]] and S¯i := Var[JˆAi [uˆ∗i]] =
∫ T
0
σAi (t)
2dt
be the nominal expected payoff and risk of customer i, respectively.
We now compare the performance of the proposed contracts to that of this optimal load control without a contract.
We choose the customer’s electricity price as the flat price, µi ≡ µ¯ = $0.11, specified in Austin Energy’s electricity
tariff for summer [54]. In the absence of a contract, the mean and variance of customer i’s payoff are b¯i and S¯i,
respectively. We set bi = b¯i and Si = ρS¯i and vary ρ from 0 to 0.3. If customer i enters into the contract, which
is the solution of (29), then the mean value of the customer’s payoff is guaranteed to be greater than or equal to
b¯i, and the variance of the customer’s payoff is guaranteed to be less than or equal to ρS¯i.
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Fig. 5: The simulation results without and with the contract (three samples are presented in the case with the
contract): (a) control (gray: ON, white: OFF); and (b) indoor temperature.
The results of numerical experiments presented in Fig. 4 verify the performance of the proposed contract. The
coefficient of load-serving entity’s risk aversion is chosen as θ = 10−2. As shown in Fig. 4 (a), The variance of the
load-serving entity’s payoff decreases as the ratio ρ of the amount of the risk that the customer is willing to bear to
the customer’s nominal risk increases. On the other hand, the variance of the customer’s payoff (blue) increases as
the ratio ρ of the amount of the risk that the customer is willing to bear to the customer’s nominal risk increases,
as shown in Fig. 4 (b). More importantly, it is less than or equal to the risk share Si = ρS¯i (red). Therefore, we
confirm that the risk-limiting condition is satisfied.
When the customer does not enter into in the contract, the variance of the load-serving entity’s payoff is
Var[JˆPi [uˆ
∗i]]
:= Var
[∫ T
0
rPi (wt, xˆ
∗i
t , uˆ
∗i
t )dt+
∫ T
0
σPi (wt)dW
i
t
]
= 0.0108.
By comparing this variance with the variance of the load-serving entity’s payoff when the contract is executed (Fig.
4 (a)), we note that the contract reduces the load-serving entity’s risk by more than 50% even when the customer
is extremely risk-averse, i.e., Si = 0. If the customer chooses Si ≥ 0.2S¯i in the contract, the load-serving entity’s
risk is decreased by more than 95%.
The mean values of the load-serving entity’s payoff with and without the contract are given by
E[JPi [C∗i, u∗i]] = 1.324, E[JˆPi [uˆ∗i]] = 1.297,
respectively. Therefore, the load-serving entity can pay $0.027 more for the customer without reducing its mean
payoff if the customer enters into a contract. In other words, the load-serving entity can incentivize the customer
to enter into the contract by increasing the customer’s expected payoff by $0.027.
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Fig. 5 shows the effect of the contract on the control and the indoor temperature. In this set of experiments, we
set Si = 0.1S¯i and θ = 10−2. When the customer does not enter into the contract, the customer regularly turns on
and off the air conditioner such that the indoor temperature is kept near 22◦C. This is because the customer wants
to save the energy cost by only taking into account the energy price µi, which is fixed for all time. On the other
hand, if the customer enters into the contract, the room is pre-cooled before 12:30pm when the LMP λt is low and
not volatile. Another pre-cooling interval is from 3pm to 4pm. This pre-cooling allows to save energy purchase
in the real-time market from 4pm to 5pm when the LMP is highly volatile. In other words, the contract properly
manages the price risk in the spot market.
C. Validation of the Brownian Motion Model Using Data
The energy consumption process of a customer is modeled by the SDE (1). In practice, the load forecast error may
not be exactly captured by the diffusion term, σ˜i(t)dW it , with a standard Brownian motion. We test the robustness
of the proposed contract method with respect to the deviation of the demand forecast errors in the data from the
Brownian motion model. More specifically, we execute the optimal contract synthesized using the Brownian motion
model over the data. Then, we compute how much the load-serving entity’s and the customer’s resulting payoffs
differ from their optimal payoffs obtained under the Brownian motion assumption. Setting Si = ρS¯i, we averaged
the percentage deviations over ρ = [0, 1]. The average deviations in the mean of the load-serving entity’s and the
customer’s payoffs are 0.010% and 0.012%, respectively. Furthermore, the risk-limiting condition is not violated
for ρ > 0.14; furthermore, for ρ ≤ 0.14, the condition is never violated by more than 12%. This preliminary test of
the proposed contract framework with respect to errors in the Brownian motion model suggests that the framework
is robust to load model errors, however more data is need for accurate approximations of the mean and variance
values. Further experiments will be performed in the future to rigorously test the validity of Brownian motion model
in the proposed contracts.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a new continuous-time dynamic contract framework that has a risk-limiting capability. The key
feature of the proposed contract is that the variance of the agent’s payoff is bounded by a threshold specified in the
contract. This feature enables the contract framework, by combining with direct load control, to provide financial
risk management solutions for real-time electricity markets. To obtain a globally optimal contract, a dynamic
programming-based method is developed. Difficulty arises in dealing with the constraints on the mean and the
variance of the agent’s payoff. We resolve this issue by introducing two new dynamical systems that have intuitive
meanings. We also proposed an approximate decomposition of the contract design problem for n agents into n
low-dimensional problems for each agent. The approximate contract obtained using the proposed decomposition
has a guaranteed suboptimality bound. This decomposability allows the direct load control program based on this
contract framework to handle a large number of customers without any scalability issue. Using the data of the
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ERCOT LMPs and electric energy consumption by customers in Austin, Texas, we perform numerical experiments
to validate the performance and usefulness of the proposed contracts.
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